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CRIMINAL LAW-Counsel-Court-Appointed Attorney Held
Absolutely Immune From Suit Under Federal Civil Rights Stat-
ute. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
In January 1975, E. George Minns, a Virginia state prisoner, re-
quested that his court-appointed attorney aid him in filing a peti-
tion for habeas corpus.' John Gray Paul had been appointed to
represent Minns pursuant to a Virginia statute' under which indi-
gent convicts could be provided with an attorney to advise them
"regarding any legal matter relating to their incarceration, other
than that pending in any court"3 for which the inmate had already
obtained an attorney.
When assistance was not forthcoming, Minns brought suit against
the attorney under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.4 Minns
alleged that his attorney, while acting under color of state law, 5 had
deprived him of rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. He argued that the deprivation
arose through the failure of his court-appointed attorney to respond
to his request for aid in filing a petition for habeas corpus.' Defen-
1. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-21.2 (1974).
3. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
5. The presence of a statute authorizing the appointment of Paul to represent Minns is
important to Minns' contention that Paul acted under color of state law. Although private
attorneys have long been considered "officers of the court," this status alone is not enough
to activate the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which requires action under color of state
law. Gozansky and Kertz, Private Lawyers'Liability Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 25 EMORY L.J.
959 (1975); see Christman v. Pennsylvania, 275 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied
sub nom. Christman v. Lesher, 393 U.S. 885 (1968). In Christman the court examined the
appointment of a private attorney to represent an indigent client in a habeas corpus action.
Although the attorney's appointment was made pursuant to a state statute the court deter-
mined that this attorney did not act under color of state law. His actions under a Pennsyl-
vania statute did not affect his status as a private individual. Id. at 435. Accord, Hamrick v.
Norton, 322 F. Supp. 424 (D. Kan. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1971).
6. Minns alleged that in early January he telephoned attorney Paul and was assured that
Paul would be back in contact with him. When he received no response, Minns wrote to Paul
on January 18; had a prison officer call on his behalf on February 5 and finally wrote a second
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dant denied this allegation and also contended that as a court-
appointed attorney he should be absolutely immune from suits aris-
ing under section 1983. 7
The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.' The court of appeals found
that Paul enjoyed absolute immunity from a section 1983 suit by
virtue of his position as a court-appointed attorney.' Because the
court agreed with Paul's contention concerning absolute immunity,
it found it unnecessary to decide whether Paul was acting under
color of state law.' 0
The language of section 1983 provides no basis for granting im-
munity from its sanctions to any class of persons. Although the
statute is addressed to "every person"" the courts have determined
that certain intrinsic immunities were not abrogated by this strong
congressional language."
The exact reach of the phrase "every person" was first construed
by the Supreme Court in Tenney v. Brandhove. 1 In Tenney, plain-
tiff alleged that a state legislative committee had called him to
testify, not in a legitimate quest for knowledge, but in an effort to
harass and silence him. 4 A strict reading of section 1983 would
suggest that those legislators could be subject to suit under the
statute, but the Supreme Court noted that legislators had tradition-
ally been accorded absolute immunity for their official actions both
at common law and under the Constitution."5 It concluded that
Congress did not intend to abrogate those immunities that were
letter on February 6. Minns claimed that Paul failed to answer any of these efforts to contact





11. See note 4 supra.
12. Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976) (prosecutors held to be immune); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public school officials held to have qualified immunity);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive members of government held to have
qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges held to be immune); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators held to be immune); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d
1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973) (public defender held to be immune);
Pierpont v. Allen, 415 F. Supp. 1386 (D. Md. 1976) (grand jurors held to be immune).
13. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
14. Id. at 371.
15. Id. at 372-73.
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"well grounded in history and reason .. .'"I Thus, despite any
impropriety in the actions of the legislative committee, the legisla-
tors were immune from suit under section 1983 as long as they were
performing their legislative functions. 7 The Tenney decision estab-
lished that the strict language of section 1983 does not preclude a
thorough examination of common law principles in determining if
immunity from suit should be accorded to any additional classes of
persons.
In Pierson v. Ray,'" the Supreme Court reiterated the same
flexible standards. Again, an examination of common law precepts
was necessary to determine if judges and policemen were immune
from suit under section 1983. The Court noted that judges histori-
cally had been accorded absolute immunity "from liability for dam-
ages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. .... 
The consideration in this instance was not the protection of the
judge but rather that of the public, "whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with inde-
pendence and without fear of consequences."' 0
Recognition of this absolute immunity in Pierson may be com-
pared with the Court's treatment of the policemen who were also
sued under section 1983.1 The Court recognized that "[t]he com-
mon law has never granted police officers an absolute and unquali-
fied immunity .. ." It was willing, however, to grant that police-
men enjoyed a qualified immunity subject to the traditional com-
mon law test of "good faith" and "probable cause. '2 3
The question of absolute immunity from section 1983 suit has also
16. Id. at 376. See also, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), in which the Court
reviewed the background of legislative and judicial immunity. Id. at 239 n.4.
17. 341 U.S. at 377. The Court was careful to point out that legislators will be protected
only when "acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." It deemed committee
investigations to be sufficiently within the traditional functions of legislators that their mo-
tives in conducting such investigations were irrelevant in establishing section 1983 liability.
Id. at 376-78.
18. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
19. Id. at 554.
20. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning of Tenney v. Brandhove in which
section 1983 immunity was seen as a benefit running directly to the public rather than to the
individual granted that immunity.
21. Id. at 555.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 556-57.
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arisen in cases concerning state executive officers24 and public
school officials.2" In both instances, the Supreme Court determined
that at best such officials could enjoy only a qualified immunity,
which would vary in degree depending upon the officials' discretion
and responsibility" or the intention of the officials in performing a
particular act."
Imbler v. Pachtman" marked the first opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to consider whether a state prosecutor could be held
liable for damages in a section 1983 suit. In that case, petitioner
Imbler contended that he had been deprived of his constitutional
rights by the prosecutor who was acting under color of state law.,
Petitioner urged the Supreme Court to deny protection from sec-
tion 1983 suits contending that the prosecutor was a member of the
Executive Branch and thus not entitled to protection under any
theory of "quasi-judicial" immunity." In so contending, Imbler
urged the Court to adopt the same limited type of immunity for
prosecutors as it had adopted in recent cases concerning executive
officers of government. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning
and reiterated the test by which prior questions of section 1983
immunity had been decided, and stated that immunity from suit
must not be made to depend upon an individual's affiliation with a
particular branch of the government but rather upon that "immun-
ity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the
interests behind it."'31
The Court then analyzed those considerations that underlie the
traditional immunity of the prosecutor from common law tort ac-
tions. It observed that the common law immunity accorded the
24. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the governor of Ohio was sued under section
1983. Petitioners alleged that his wanton and reckless deployment of the Ohio National Guard
resulted in the deaths of several students. Id. at 235.
25. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), public school authorities were sued under
section 1983. Petitioners alleged that in their expulsion from school for the use of intoxicating
beverages they had been denied due process of law.
26. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
27. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
28. 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
29. Id. at 988.
30. Id. at 990. Petitioner argued that immunity from suit must derive from the same
species of immunity that the court identified in holding judges immune from section 1983
suits in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
31. 96 S. Ct. at 990.
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prosecutor is based upon the same principles that have created
common law tort immunity for judges and grand jurors:3"
The office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with
courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made
subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict? . . . The
apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness and
toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should character-
ize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus
be impeded, and we would have moved away from the desired objective of
stricter and fairer law enforcement.
After reviewing these common law justifications for prosecutorial
immunity, the Supreme Court decided to accord absolute immunity
to prosecutors sued under section 1983. The Court reasoned that a
prosecutor who was forced to make decisions tempered by fears of
potential personal liability simply could not fulfill the duties of his
office." Any possibility of qualified immunity for prosecutors was
firmly rejected as the Court distinguished between prosecutors and
other "executive or administrative officials."34 These other officials,
accorded qualified immunity from section 1983 suits, would face a
far smaller burden than a prosecutor in defending such suits. The
prosecutor could not even begin to defend them. The very nature of
his office, handling numerous trials and indictments, lends itself to
frequent suit. Absent absolute immunity, the prosecutor would have
to answer and defend each suit.
In protecting prosecutors from section 1983 suits, the Supreme
Court conceded that the defendant with a legitimate complaint is
left without a civil remedy. It reasoned that the alternative of
offering qualified immunity would dilute the efforts of the prosecu-
tor by requiring him to defend even the most frivolous suit. More-
over, the wronged defendant is not completely without remedy,
nor is the public left at the mercy of an unscrupulous prosecutor.
The Court noted that neither judges nor prosecutors are "beyond
the reach of the criminal law," 6 and the prosecutor is subject to
32. Id. at 992, quoting Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935).
33. 96 S. Ct. at 992.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 993.
36. Id. at 994. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
1977]
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discipline by his professional peers."
The court in Minns recognized that a decision to grant section
1983 immunity to a court-appointed attorney would have to be
based upon the common law principles enunciated in Pierson and
Imbler.31 The court noted that "there is virtually no common law
with respect to the personal liability of court appointed-counsel. ' 3
It chose to analogize his role with that of the prosecutor as discussed
in Imbler and readily concluded that the court-appointed attorney
should enjoy the same immunity accorded the state prosecutor. The
court of appeals pointed out the three-fold role of government in
criminal proceedings; the government provides the prosecutor, the
judge, and the defense counsel for indigents.19 With significant gov-
ernment involvement at both counsel tables the court concluded
that many of the policy reasons requiring prosecutorial immunity
should operate equally in securing immunity for the court-
appointed attorney."
The Minns court took particular notice of the Third Circuit's
decision in Brown v. Joseph" in which the court concluded that
state-appointed and state-subsidized defenders should enjoy im-
munities equal to those enjoyed by judges and prosecutors. The
Third Circuit cogently expressed the policy reasons that require
court-appointed attorneys and state prosecutors to be treated in the
same manner for purposes of section 1983 immunity:4 3
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
37. 96 S. Ct. at 994 n.30. At this point the Supreme Court was careful to delineate the
boundaries of its holding. Prosecutors were to be immune from section 1983 suits only when
initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case. Id. at 995. This concept of prosecu-
torial immunity was applied recently in Pierpont v. Allen, 415 F. Supp. 1386 (D. Md. 1976)
where the court determined that when a prosecutor functions as a policeman he will be
accorded a more limited species of immunity; unqualified immunity is reserved for the chief
functions of the prosecutor's office.
38. 542 F.2d at 900-01.
39. Id. at 901. The court observed that the obligation to provide counsel for indigent
defendants has arisen only since the relatively recent decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). Id.
40. 542 F.2d at 901.
41. Id.
42. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 1048-49, quoted in Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 901. See also John v. Hurt, 489
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We perceive no valid reason to extend this immunity to state and federal
prosecutors and judges and to withhold it from state-appointed and state-
subsidized defenders. Implicit in the extension of judicial immunity to prose-
cutors was the recognition of a public policy encouraging free exercise of
professional discretion in the discharge of pre-trial, trial, and post-trial obli-
gations. Indeed, the very reasons advanced to assert that the Public Defender
acts under color of state law because of the favorable comparison of his
activities with those of public prosecutors, would, a fortiori, support an argu-
ment in favor of the public defender on the immunity issue.
The Minns court approved the policy considerations mentioned
in Brown." It determined that the policy reasons requiring absolute
immunity for court-appointed attorneys were: (1) fear of liability
under section 1983 might deter able attorneys from representing
indigents; and (2) attorneys must be permitted to exercise profes-
sional discretion in planning their clients' defenses.45
Minns expressed the hope that absolute immunity would encour-
age representation of indigents by full and part-time public defend-
ers as well as by private attorneys appointed by the court." But the
court's principal discussion of the policy considerations focused on
the issue of professional discretion. In order to function effectively,
the court-appointed attorney must be free "to decline to press the
frivilous" and "to assign priorities between indigent litigants
... ,' This concept of professional discretion takes on a special
character in the case of an indigent litigant. Indigents experience no
financial constraints on the advancement of frivilous claims. 8
Moreover, the court-appointed attorney does not have the option of
turning away those clients who persist in pressing unsound claims.4
Minns gave particular attention to the distinction between abso-
lute and qualified immunity. Citing Imbler,5' the Minns court noted
that qualified immunity, while offering some protection, would re-
quire that the merits of most section 1983 suits be determined at
F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973) in which the court determined that those factors which mandate
section 1983 immunity for prosecutors also mandate section 1983 immunity for public defend-
ers.




48. Id. at 901-02.
49. Id.
50. 96 S. Ct. 984, 992 (1976).
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trial. This would be overly burdensome for the court-appointed at-
torneys who could better devote their time to the defense of other
indigents. The court recognized the natural inclination of an unsuc-
cessful litigant to blame his court-appointed attorney. Given such
fertile ground for the propagation of section 1983 suits, the court
reasoned that absolute immunity, which would defeat a suit before
trial, was the only reasonable response to the problem."
The court offered the facts of the instant case to demonstrate the
need for absolute rather than qualified immunity. Minns brought
suit thirty-seven days after a written request for aid from his court-
appointed attorney. The court noted that thirty-seven days was not
an unusual delay,"2 but without the protection of absolute immunity
Paul would be required to defend the suit at trial. Presumably, if
the suit were to proceed, the services of a second court-appointed
attorney would be required to aid Minns in suing Paul.
The Minns court also expressed great concern over the possible
existence of insidious subconscious influences to which judges could
be subjected if court-appointed attorneys were denied the
protection of absolute immunity. 3 It noted the Supreme Court's
observation in Imbler54 that judges charged with appellate review
should be concerned only with the fairness of appellant's trial and
not with the possibility that a reversal could prompt a section 1983
suit against the prosecutor.5 Similarly, prosecutors should not be
discouraged, even if subsconsciously, from bringing evidence favor-
able to the accused to the attention of the court. 6 An important
factor in the Minns decision was the presence of other remedies
through which a defendant could seek redress for the deprivation of
any constitutionally secured rights. These included "direct appeal,
51. 542 F.2d at 902.
52. See note 3 supra. The court did not seem troubled by the possibility that absent
the present suit, Paul might never have answered Minns. Although the court focused on the
thirty-seven day delay and found that it was not excessive, the actual time which elapsed
between Minns' first contact with Paul and the present suit could have been as much as forty-
seven days. 542 F.2d at 900.
53. 542 F.2d at 902.
54. Id.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 999 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 993 n.25. The Court noted that it was District Attorney Pachtman's own efforts
to present new findings favorable to defendant Imbler that provided the grounds for Imbler's
section 1983 suit. Id.
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a state post-conviction remedy, or . . .federal habeas corpus."57
Additionally, a defendant not satisfied with the performance of his
court-appointed attorney "may proceed pro se. '" In extreme in-
stances involving deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights, the
offending court-appointed attorney would be subject to criminal
sanctions. 9 Finally, court-appointed attorneys are subject to profes-
sional disciplinary proceedings, including disbarment, when they do
not properly fulfill the duties of their office. 0
The granting of absolute immunity to court-appointed attorneys
is a sound extension of the reasoning advanced by the Supreme
Court in Tenney,"' Pierson2 and Imbler. 3 Indigent convicts repre-
sented by court-appointed attorneys will benefit in the long run. 4
To accord less than absolute immunity would discourage private
attorneys from representing indigents. Once a private attorney is
appointed, he should be free to exercise the full range of his profes-
sional discretion without constant fear of having to answer in dam-
ages to subsequently disgruntled clients. 5
Although the goal of efficient representation of indigents is proba-
bly best served when the court-appointed attorney is held immune
from section 1983 suits, there are certain dangers in this holding.
Minns has pointed to a wide variety of remedies of which the
aggrieved defendant may avail himself, but it is doubtful that these
57. 542 F.2d at 902, citing Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972). But see
Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 (1976) in which the Supreme Court held that federal
habeas corpus will not be available to defendants who have had an adequate forum in the
state courts. This holding suggests that federal habeas corpus is not nearly as effective a
remedy as the courts implied in Minns.
58. 542 F.2d at 902, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
59. See note 36 supra.
60. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984, 994 (1976).
61. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
62. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
63. 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
64. But see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-67 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas in
Pierson urged the Court to adopt a very strict reading of section 1983 and hold that the words
"every person" mean exactly that and admit to no exceptions. 386 U.S. at 559.
65. The direction taken by the courts in recent years suggests that it makes little differ-
ence whether the court-appointed attorney is appointed under state statute or is a member
of a legal aid or public defender organization. It appears that the courts are reluctant to
consider an attorney to be acting under color of state law merely because some public agency
pays him to represent indigent clients. See note 12 supra.
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remedies are as effective as potential section 1983 liability in deter-
ring improper conduct by the court-appointed attorney." Thus,
courts must be vigilant in guarding against any tendency by the
inexperienced attorney to "practice" on indigent clients or to treat
the indigent client with any less respect that he would accord his
private clients.
William A. Cahill, Jr.
66. See note 57 supra.
